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25 July 1959

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN




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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25 July 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

NO USSR: The strong bloc reaction to President Eisenhower's proclamation of "Captive Nations Week" reflects Moscow's extreme sensitivity to any official Western reference to the subjugation of the peoples of the Communist nations. The Soviet leaders are apparently particularly piqued at the timing of the proclamation to coincide with Vice President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, during which they probably planned to probe for flexibilities in the US position on the Geneva negotiations and on the possibility of an early summit conference. Khrushchev's 23 July speech on his return from Poland condemned the US proclamation as "infamous slander" aimed at the socialist camp, and invited the vice president to "have a look at these 'enslaved peoples.'" A further reference to the US action sparked an exchange between the vice president and Khrushchev at a 24 July pre-opening tour of the American exhibition in Moscow. Reaction from other bloc countries was highlighted by an official Czech protest.

NO Communist China - Morocco: [Communist China reportedly has asked Morocco for permission to open consulates in Fez, Marrakech, and Tangier, indicating a major effort to expand activities in that country.]

NO [ ] the Moroccan Government is considering the request. Since Rabat recognized Peiping last October, the Chinese have moved quickly to develop propaganda outlets in Morocco, where there is popular interest in the economic progress made by Communist China [ ]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO Tunisia-Algeria: Relations between President Bourguiba and the Algerian rebels appear to be deteriorating further in the wake of attacks on 19-20 and 22-23 July against Tunisian outposts and personnel in the Algerian-Tunisian border area. Rebel leaders, and especially their troops operating in the border region, have long been dissatisfied with the support they receive from Tunis, and Bourguiba's public admonition to them on 23 July to avoid further breaches of Tunisian sovereignty could provoke some rebel elements to attempt new anti-Tunisian activity.

NO

NO Iran: The Shah is again showing discouragement over the rate of Iranian military progress and over what he regards as lack of moral and material support in this current trouble with the USSR. He feels that the Baghdad Pact does not offer Iran adequate protection and says he may have "to reconsider Iran's Baghdad Pact commitments."

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OK Dalai Lama: The Dalai Lama has decided to press for submission of the Tibet case to the UN General Assembly, although it is not clear how he expects the question will be raised. The Tibetan leader is ready to make a personal appearance at the UN if necessary, and is preparing documentary evidence to support

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[his case. He still hopes to travel abroad to publicize the Tibetan question, and intends soon to send out two high-level delegations, one to Southeast Asia and the other to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, with the same aim. The Dalai Lama reportedly is also preparing a message for circulation in Tibet encouraging resistance. Sporadic rebel activity continues in some Tibetan areas.]

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### III. THE WEST

*No* Greece: [The Greek Government is expressing fears of severe internal political and economic repercussions if its application for association with the European Common Market (EEC) is not approved at the EEC meeting scheduled for 25 July. While members of the Common Market generally favor Greek association, affirmative action on the application may be delayed for some time. There is concern that acceptance of the special Greek terms for membership would set an undesirable precedent, and a belief that acceptance of Greece at this time might hinder development of an eventual multi-lateral European economic association.]

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### LATE ITEM

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Strong Bloc Reaction to "Captive Nations Week"

The Congressional resolution and the President's proclamation on "Captive Nations Week"--a week of prayer for the enslaved peoples of Eastern Europe--was condemned throughout the Communist bloc as "foul slander" against Soviet policy and "blatant and arrogant interference" in the internal affairs of free and sovereign states. The bloc reaction reflects Moscow's extreme sensitivity to any official Western reference to the subjugation of the peoples of the Communist nations.

Khrushchev set the tone for this reaction in his speech on his return from Poland in which he termed the US action "direct interference" in Soviet internal affairs and an "infamous slander." Khrushchev then questioned why "the Americans are sending us US governors and vice presidents opening exhibitions and at the same time are talking about enslaved nations." His description of the US action--during a 24 June pre-opening tour of the US exhibit--as a "black cat that Congress let run across the road" sparked a sharp exchange between the vice president and the Soviet premier in which Khrushchev declared that the USSR would not "budge one inch" at Geneva. The Soviet leaders may view the US action at this time as an indication of a firm stand to be taken by the vice president during his visit--which they had hoped would reveal weaknesses in the US position at Geneva and open the way for an early summit conference.

[The Czech Government has officially protested this "new American provocation" and expressed "amazement" that the US President had approved and announced this "hostile act." The Czech deputy foreign minister said he would not comment on the numerous historical, geographical, and ethnographical inaccuracies and misrepresentations in the resolution, but that Czechoslovakia found it strange to be listed with Cossackia and Idel-Ural, "whatever that was." He added he was at a loss to understand how the United States could hope to continue to recognize and maintain official relations with socialist governments while officially characterizing them as captive.]

The Polish press expressed regret that circles attempting to sharpen the cold war have drawn the President into this affair.

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[REDACTED]  
Shah of Iran Renews Bid for Increased Western Support

[The Shah of Iran, in a recent lengthy criticism of what he views as a lack of Western moral and military support, warned that he may have to reconsider Iran's Baghdad Pact commitments. Discouraged by what he regards as the slow rate of Iranian military progress, he charged that the pact does not offer Iran adequate protection against either direct attack or small local wars. He urged that military thinking concerning Iran should focus on the problems of possible conflict with Iraq or Afghanistan and the need for a delaying capability in the event of a Soviet ground attack. His demands, which far exceed Iran's ability to absorb, include the development of a limited bombing capability and the use of such modern weapons as antiaircraft guided missiles and Honest John rockets.]

[Despite the Shah's depression and criticism of the lack of Allied support in the Iranian-Soviet propaganda struggle, he firmly asserted that Iran should make no conciliatory gesture to the USSR. Contrary to his expressed opinion that Soviet propaganda attacks are unproductive, however, there are continuing indications of their effectiveness. The Shah is also overoptimistic in his evaluation of the internal situation in Iran, where the anticorruption program is showing little impact and where dissatisfaction with the regime is resulting in growing conspiracy.] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Dalai Lama to Expand International Campaign to Publicize Tibet

[The Dalai Lama has decided to press for submission of the Tibet question to the UN General Assembly this fall. The Tibetan leader is prepared to deliver an appeal to the UN in person if necessary, and is compiling evidence of Chinese atrocities in Tibet to substantiate his case.]

[Any UN discussion of the Dalai Lama's claim would have the support of many Latin American and Western European members who view the question in terms of human rights. Any of those member countries might sponsor the introduction of the issue in the General Assembly. The Indian Government would be likely to take the position that a hearing would serve no useful purpose and would only heighten tensions. Prime Minister Nehru, in fact, has stated that UN consideration of Tibet would be difficult since Communist China is not represented. However, New Delhi probably would not go to extreme lengths to try to block consideration of Tibet or to prevent the Dalai Lama from traveling to New York, despite its refusal to recognize his claim to leadership of a Tibetan government-in-exile.]

[The Dalai Lama had received no official invitation as of 17 July to visit any other country, but he still wishes to travel abroad to promote the Tibetan cause. Thailand's King Phumiphon has privately expressed the view that a visit by the Tibetan Buddhist leader might prejudice the King's position in Thailand as "defender of the faith."]

[The Dalai Lama intends to send two high-level delegations on international tours, one to Southeast Asia, and the other to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, to publicize the Tibetan plight and to sound out probable reaction to his own projected tour]

[The Dalai Lama reportedly is also preparing a message for circulation in Tibet encouraging resistance. The Tibetans remain loyal to their religious leader, and his message will hearten them in their resistance to the Chinese. While most of the dissidence in Tibet has been suppressed, sporadic guerrilla activity is expected to continue for a long time.]

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### III. THE WEST

#### Greece Fears Rejection or Membership in Common Market

[Greek Government leaders have expressed anxiety over reports that Greece's application for association in the European Economic Community (EEC)--the Common Market--is facing new obstacles. Following its confidential application in June for special association with EEC, the Greek Government leaked information to the press regarding the advantages that would accrue to Greece from this association. This has been followed by nationwide speculation regarding the issue, and the general assumption has emerged that the Greek application would be accepted. Failure of the EEC to take favorable action on the application, at a meeting tentatively scheduled for 25 July, would give opposition politicians another opportunity to discredit the government's political and economic policies.]

[In addition, important segments of the Greek business community are complaining that Greece, plagued with agricultural surpluses and hard hit by the world shipping slump, can ill afford its present "free trade" policy. Continued nonparticipation in the Common Market will place Greek exports at an even greater competitive disadvantage.]

[Despite a generally favorable reaction to Greek membership, the Common Market may delay taking definitive action for some time. Athens has requested extensive tariff concessions and access to the development funds of the European Investment Bank. Some Common Market officials fear that acceptance of these terms could not be justified under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and are reluctant to establish a precedent for other lesser developed countries.]

[Moreover, the Greek application comes at a time when the Common Market is divided over the future course of its relations with other countries of Western Europe. Leaders like West German Vice Chancellor Erhard, who advocates a broader multilateral European economic association, probably fear that bilateral Greek association with the Common Market would complicate its achievement.]

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